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“[A]lmost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all 
of their obligations almost all of the time.” (Henkin, 1979, p. 47). Just like many hu-
man rights scholars, Louis Henkin, Law Expert on this topic, is optimistic about the 
protection of basic rights. Despite the missing clarity on the definition of the term 
‘almost’, any empirical evidence for this statement is lacking. Watching the news cre-
ates quite a different picture and insights from respective non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) point in the same direction. In just the last three years, the exercise 
of torture was reported in at least 141 countries (Amnesty International, 2020c), 3.2 
million people in prison worldwide have not yet had a trial (Amnesty International, 
2020a) and 70.8 million people have forcibly been displaced (Amnesty International, 
2020b). 
When thinking about human rights violations, pictures of torture taking place at con-
flict scenes far away from the Western world most commonly come to the imagina-
tion. However, unlawful treatment of citizens does not only occur far away; it is also 
present at our doorsteps. Even in democracies where citizens feel most protected 
against severe interventions of their basic rights, violations take place. In 2019, the 
European Court of Human Rights was for instance appealed 44,500 times (ECHR, 
2020). Besides, caesura of asylum rights is reported in democratic and developed 
countries around the world, prominently among them in Australia (Amnesty 
International, 2016). This shows that while the existing literature has identified that 
democracies protect human rights better and comply more often with respective in-
ternational obligations, they do not have a clean record either. 
In past research, much attention has been paid to the differences between regime 
types in regard to rights protection and compliance. The focus was thereby placed on 
the human rights situation in illiberal or autocratic countries as their improvement 
was regarded most pressing. Evidence was obtained that little or no enhancement is 
achieved in abusive regimes through the ratification of international human rights 
treaties (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). In democracies, conversely, a negative cor-
relation with human rights violations exists on average (e.g. Davenport & Armstrong, 
2004). Therefore, respective research mostly ceased with the observation that 
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democracies are better compliers compared to autocracies. However, it does not sig-
nify human rights protection in democracies in all regards as demonstrated above. 
The concrete patterns of compliance among democracies have not yet received 
enough attention from scholars. Consequently, the thesis at hand questions these 
patterns and concretely asks: Do democracies comply with international human 
rights law? How do they comply and when? 
The research question is relevant in two ways: Firstly, as human rights violations take 
place every day around the world, research concerned with containing such inhuman 
practises possesses clear, societal relevance. Up until now, international human 
rights treaties have been a prominent approach to elevate the protection of basic 
rights on a state level. Thus, this study deals with the compliance of democracies with 
human rights law in order to provide valuable insights for improving respect of rights 
around the world. If political researchers do not yet precisely understand the pat-
terns of compliance among democracies, the prospects for ameliorating the human 
rights situation in autocratic regimes through such conventions are very scant. 
Secondly, the research question is relevant from a theoretical perspective as it adds 
to the literature on compliance through its innovative theoretical assumptions. While 
a lot of extant literature generally deals with the effect of a democratic regime on 
human rights respect and compliance, only few scholars have looked into concrete 
democratic cases and assessed differing levels of compliance. Also, even though (ra-
ther sceptical) research exists on the effect of review mechanisms evaluating state 
compliance with international regulations, this is not yet investigated in regard to 
democracies. Furthermore, many research projects have only taken into account the 
effect of single individual treaties, traditionally the ICCPR (e.g. Keith, 1999). Thereby, 
studies deployed statistical analyses on the impact of human rights treaties on a ra-
ther big sample or group of countries, mostly reporting little evidence for change and 
not giving details about the individual patterns of influence (e.g. Hafner-Burton & 
Tsutsui, 2005). In order to fill these research gaps, this paper aims at answering the 
posed question by analysing only one country, but in all its complexity, taking into 
account the impact of all ratified UN human rights treaties. 
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The question of compliance of democracies with international human rights instru-
ments will consequently be addressed in this thesis. The second chapter starts off by 
explaining the core concepts relevant to this paper. It then highlights the different 
theoretical assumptions for general human rights protection and identifies the repu-
tational approach (Guzman, 2002, 2005, 2008) of institutionalism as the most suita-
ble theory. Thus, three hypotheses are deduced from it, predicting that (1) compli-
ance exists among democracies, (2) compliance differs dependent on the costs of the 
treaties, and (3) forthcoming reviews provoke greater efforts in compliance. The hy-
potheses are to be tested through a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative anal-
ysis of a single country. Australia is selected for this purpose as a difficult but com-
pelling case. The empirical analysis in chapter four is divided into three sections each 
analysing one hypothesis. The data provides support for all of the deduced assump-
tions. The results are interpreted in chapter five as well as limitations and outlooks 
are displayed. Chapter six comprises concluding remarks for the thesis.  
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2. Human rights compliance in literature and theory 
The present thesis is concerned with the compliance of democratic states with inter-
national human rights law. In order to address this question, the core concepts are 
explored in the first step. The main theories offering explanations for compliance 
with human rights are presented afterwards. The reputational argument is identified 
as the most suitable approach for the thesis. Consequently, hypotheses on the com-
pliance patterns of democracies are deduced from the reputational argument. 
2.1 Core concepts: Human rights and compliance 
The concept of human rights refers to basic, fundamental rights applicable to every 
person derived from their human nature regardless of other conditions. Not much 
discourse exists regarding the definition of the term. A widely accepted phrasing is 
the one proposed by the United Nations (UN): 
“Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, 
nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights in-
clude the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom 
of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. 
Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.” (United Nations, 
2020a) 
This definition is cited not only because it is broadly accepted but also due to the fact 
that the UN represents the most influential institution for human rights protection 
worldwide. The organisation has occupied a prominent role in establishing the re-
spective legal framework for human rights. The first major achievement was accom-
plished on 10th December 1948 when the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR; United Nations, 2020b). Since then, the 
UN has adopted the following nine human rights agreements as well as several op-
tional protocols to them (OHCHR, 2012): 
• The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (ICERD) 
• The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
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• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) 
• The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
• The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (ICPMW) 
• The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
• The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICED) 
These obtain the concrete provisions translating the basic rights of the UDHR into 
treaties that become binding once ratified by a country. Accordingly, they are the 
ones that directly postulate measures for states and of which the implementation is 
monitored by the UN human rights apparatus and respective treaty bodies. This fact 
is substantial as governments are regarded liable for the task to guarantee basic 
rights to their citizens and are held responsible for it by International Human Rights 
Law. The treaties are later on used for the analysis of this thesis.  
The second key concept of this thesis is compliance which is conventionally under-
stood as conformity with some kind of regulation. As Oran Young (1979) phrased it, 
it refers to the “degree to which state behavior conforms to what an agreement pre-
scribes or proscribes” (p. 104). In this thesis, the conformity refers particularly to hu-
man rights legislation. Compliance, therefore, stands for conformity of a state with 
regulations of international human rights law that the state has previously agreed to 
and is thus applicable in the country. To put it the other way around, Chayes and 
Chayes state that “noncompliance is the premeditated and deliberate violation of a 
treaty obligation” (1993, p. 187). 
It is critical to distinguish between compliance with a treaty and its effect(iveness). 
While compliance targets the general fulfilment of obligations, it neglects whether 
states made changes over time or already met all provisions from the beginning. The 
interrogation of the effect of a treaty, by contrast, is directed to the changes 
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provoked exclusively by the agreement at hand. In this manner, full compliance lies 
less in the focus than a pre-post-comparison or the development since the law was 
in place. Therefore, compliance with human rights law does not automatically involve 
improvement in the human rights situation. Although the two are typically intercon-
nected, it is, for example, possible that a state fulfils all clauses of a treaty, but the de 
facto situation does not enhance due to the failure of the treaty makers to formulate 
effective requirements (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1965). Although both concepts seem 
worth analyzing, this thesis will specifically focus on compliance with international 
human rights instruments instead of their effect. 
2.2 Theories on human rights and compliance 
All of the four leading theoretical schools of International Relations offer explana-
tions and predictions on compliance with human rights and the respective law. The 
differing theories produce varying anticipations for human rights treaties and also 
distinct empirical findings. In order to comprehend the state of research, it is pivotal 
to provide an overview of the dominant theories. Thus, their key assumptions are 
assessed in the following, and their explanatory potential is consequently discussed 
in order to identify the most fitting approach for the research question at hand. 
To start off with, liberalism (e.g. Simmons, 2000, 2008, 2009) argues that the domes-
tic arrangements of states matter as to whether they respect human rights and com-
ply with the respective instruments. A strong civil society is, for instance, a factor that 
enhances compliance, and supporting evidence has been reported (e.g. Moravcsik, 
1995; Neumayer, 2005). Similarly, transnational activist networks composed of a va-
riety of NGOs and other civil society actors can increase compliance by enabling the 
bypassing of governments and creating international attention and pressure. Evi-
dence was provided by case studies in Latin America (Lutz & Sikkink, 2000; Martin & 
Sikkink, 1993; Sikkink, 1993). Another factor altering the expectations in compliance 
with international law is the presence of robust legal domestic institutions 
(Moravcsik, 1995). 
The most prominent liberal assumption insists that democracies are more protective 
of human rights than autocracies (e.g. tested by Davenport, 1995, 1999; Davenport 
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& Armstrong, 2004; Fein, 1995; Harff, 2003; Henderson, 1993; King, 1998; Poe & Tate, 
1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1999; Regan & Henderson, 2002). This is anticipated as dem-
ocratic political leaders, on one hand, are more restricted in the use of violent means 
against their citizens by democratic institutions. On the other hand, democracies pos-
sess a broader range of measures for conflict resolution and democratic socialisation 
tends to disapprove of violence as a means for it (Poe et al., 1999, p. 293). Not only 
state repression is estimated to occur less often in democracies, but liberalists expect 
them to be likelier to comply with international law, as well and have provided em-
pirical evidence for the claim (e.g. Gaubatz, 1996; Mansfield, Milner, & Rosendorff, 
2002; Neumayer, 2005). A study by Jana Von Stein (2016) has, for example, demon-
strated that the ratification of the Minimum Age Convention against child labour 
caused improvement in this domain among democracies while autocracies have of-
ten ratified but seldomly complied with the treaty. Alternatively, scholars have ar-
gued that it is rather the transition to democracy (Simmons, 2008) or the rule of law 
principle (Simmons, 2000) that make the real difference. 
While liberalism has paid extensive attention to democracies already and offers some 
accurate explanations for the compliance of this regime type, the theory nevertheless 
does not seem optimal for the purpose of this thesis. The approach offers explana-
tions solely based on the domestic political system. Ergo, it provides insights into the 
variation between countries or overtime in one state due to different institutional 
arrangements. However, liberalism does not give so much information on the com-
pliance patterns of a specific country. Concretely, it does not reveal why the same 
country at the same time should respect one treaty while neglecting another one 
since the democratic arrangement stays controlled. As this thesis is concerned with 
finding out more about individual compliance patterns of democracies, exactly this 
explanatory potential is needed. Liberalism cannot offer this and will therefore not 
be used for testing the research question at hand. 
A second perspective is provided by constructivism whose exponents are overall very 
optimistic about the spread of and compliance with human rights around the world 
(Henkin, 1979). As common values shape state preferences according to the theory, 
international organisations as well as other actors like NGOs can establish norms and 
teach state leaders to respect both rights and law (Finnemore, 1996). This happens 
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through socialisation processes enabled by the dialogue on human rights which leads 
to the emergence and establishment of common virtues and consequently creates 
pressure to comply (Abbott & Snidal, 2000).  
As socialisation endures, time remains a crucial factor for the measurable success of 
international law in the constructivist view. Chayes and Chayes (1993) stated “that 
there will be a considerable time lag after the treaty is concluded before some or all 
of the parties can bring themselves into compliance.” (p.195). In accordance, studies 
that tried to find enhancement in the same year or one year after ratification of in-
ternational human rights treaties have failed to do so (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Keith, 
1999; Neumayer, 2005). However, research that tested compliance in regard to the 
years passed since the treaties came into force has not found any empirical support 
either (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). 
By assuming that human rights represent internationally established norms that 
shape state behaviour, constructivism offers a valuable explanation for the respect 
of rights even if costs seem to prevail benefits. This represents a domain in which 
other theories based on the premise of rational actors traditionally perform poorly. 
Constructivism has less potential for expounding situations in which states do not 
comply with rights. As human rights are seen as universal norms, only competing val-
ues could explain non-conformity with them. These clashing norms, however, do not 
seem to exist for human rights. Thus, constructivist scholars have paid only little at-
tention to such cases (Liese, 2006, pp. 45-47). Since a theoretical frame is needed to 
potentially offer insights for both compliance and non-compliance, constructivism 
does not seem adequate for the present research. 
As a third approach, the realist perspective (e.g. Goldsmith & Posner, 1999, 2005; 
Krasner, 1993) assumes international treaties to make no difference. States act ac-
cording to their national considerations and interests instead of non-binding interna-
tional law. They operate within an anarchic system in which a monopoly of power is 
vacant. Hence, no principal authority is able to enforce international regulations. As 
states do not fear sanctions, no need evolves to alter domestic politics. In fact, realists 
deem the relationship to be upside down: international treaties mirror states’ inter-
ests. These interests are responsible for either the protection or violation of human 
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rights. As political leaders are assumed to be rational actors, they follow their inter-
ests when deciding to oppress their people. This means that they do not necessarily 
enjoy the imprisonment of political rivals or other repressive actions, but that they 
deploy them as effective tools to reach their goal, for example when perceiving 
threats to their authority (see Gurr, 1986; Poe et al., 1999). 
Goldsmith and Posner (1999, 2005) introduce the four mechanisms of coincidence of 
interest, cooperation, coercion and coordination which make for improvement in hu-
man rights. These strategies are not imposed by international law but by other mostly 
powerful states if these means serve their interests. Evidence for the imposition of 
human rights by other states has for example been found in regard to the US and 
Latin America (Schoultz, 2014). As a consequence, states only sign and ratify interna-
tional treaties they assume to cause greater benefits than costs (e.g., consisting of 
pressure from another state). Due to their weak enforcement, the costs of joining UN 
human rights instruments are low. This applies explicitly to liberal democracies as 
they typically already act according to the principles of such treaties. Benefits arise 
as states nevertheless hope for some improvement of human rights in other states. 
Additionally, critique for a country’s human rights practice may be less noisy when 
there is at least oral commitment to the rights. Based on realist assumptions, scholars 
have managed to explain cases of selective or weak human rights protection (e.g. 
Evans, 1996; Krasner, 1993). In addition, Cardenas (2007) showed that international 
pressure for human rights protection leads to the ratification of corresponding trea-
ties rather than a decrease in rights violations. 
Despite its explanatory potential in scenarios, when human rights are disregarded, 
realism cannot explain cases in which countries defend rights without the prospect 
of benefits. The realist perspective is additionally not appropriate for this research 
because human rights respect is argued not to be influenced by international law but 
only by the actions of other states. This thesis does, however, aim at investigating the 
human rights situation in regard to compliance with respective instruments and not 
evaluate the mechanisms or strategies deployed by other countries. The realist ap-
proach offers therefore limited explanatory potential for the question at hand. 
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In institutionalism – like in realism – states are perceived as rational actors. But in 
contrary to the previous approach, institutionalist scholars place a focus on the inter-
dependence of states rather than the anarchy of the international sphere. Institu-
tionalists also base their theory on interests; they see the chance of institutions low-
ering transaction costs between states and, thus, make cooperation reachable 
(Keohane & Nye, 1973). International politics can be understood as a type of game-
play in which trust and allocation of resources make a difference in whether cooper-
ation takes place or not. The interest constellations are decisive and seem especially 
weak in the realm of human rights as the anticipated benefits are low (Moravcsik, 
2000). 
Andrew Guzman (2002, 2005) extends the institutionalist assumptions by the factor 
of reputation as an additional element influencing a state’s interest. According to 
him, reputational concerns might motivate a state to comply, while other non-repu-
tational interests may support the choice not to comply which create a payoff. The 
author solves this competition of interests as follows: 
“Suppose now that the state's non-reputational payoffs give it an incentive to 
play "defect," creating tension between the two sources of payoffs. The state 
will play "comply" if and only if the reputational payoffs it would receive are 
sufficiently large to trump the non-reputational payoffs.” (Guzman, 2005, p. 
384) 
The benefits arising from compliance as well as the impact of reputation on cooper-
ation possibilities are tested and supported by a variety of scholars (e.g. Downs & 
Jones, 2002; Hillebrecht, 2012; Salonen & Wiberg, 1987). Overall, the reputational 
argument offers explanations for a wide scope of cases as it is possible to comment 
on compliant as well as non-compliant state behaviour. As reputational and non-rep-
utational interests play a role in the theory, it provides detailed interpretation possi-
bilities not only on the large scale of countries but also in regard to single cases. Not 
only inter-state but also intra-state comparison is enabled. Consequently, the insti-
tutionalist reputation theory will be adduced as the theoretical framework for the 
analysis. 
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2.3 Institutionalist assumptions on human rights compliance 
Having assessed the explanatory potential and shortcomings of the theories on com-
pliance regarding the case of democracies, the reputational approach was identified 
as the most suitable one for this research question. The theory will now be described 
in more detail in order to deduce respective hypotheses. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the reputational argument represents an ex-
tension of the institutionalist theory in International Relations. Andrew Guzman 
(2002, 2005, 2008) is the most prominent spokesperson of this approach and postu-
lates his arguments as a direct counter draft to Goldsmith and Posner’s realist ideas. 
In contrary to them, Guzman provides an optimistic prospect to compliance with in-
ternational human rights law. The factor of reputation is added to the considerations 
of a state whether to comply and influences respective trade-offs. Reputation may in 
this context be understood as a state’s reputational history to conform with interna-
tional law and “consists of judgements about the state’s past behavior and predic-
tions made about future compliance based on that behavior” (Guzman, 2008, p. 33). 
A ‘good’ reputation represents that a state undertakes its responsibility for interna-
tional agreements. The image of a reliable partner evolves, and other states1 may 
choose this country over other ones for further cooperation. Reputational damage, 
on the other hand, refers to the costs a state has to carry if it chooses not to comply 
and therefore becomes a less important partner on the international stage. 
A state’s reputational history matters as reputation does not form on the basis of a 
single decision but originates from the pattern of compliance or non-compliance. If a 
state A has continuously decided not to comply in the past, a single compliance act 
will not eradicate the previous shortcomings. Instead, the state’s reputation cannot 
be damaged as it is already ‘bad’. This makes further compliance less likely and rep-
utation can thus reproduce itself. As an opposing example, a state B that has always 
respected international law receives benefits by new cooperation being less costly. 
The incentives for state B are greater to comply with any upcoming regulation due to 
 
1 Scholars have argued that a state is not only concerned with its reputation among other states, but 
also among the transnational civil society (see Price, 2003). As the two forms of reputation motivate 
states in the same way and thus produce similar assumptions, it is only drawn on the reputation among 
other states for this thesis since this is the more prominent argument as deployed by Guzman. 
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the fact that it can lose credibility among its partners or deter new partners by vio-
lating international rules. Liberal democracies do generally have a better record in 
compliance (Leeds, 1999; Martin, 2000) as their domestic institutions ensure adher-
ence to international commitments more effectively than other states. Thus, they 
usually have a good reputation history and are regarded as credible partners. Conse-
quently, reputation damage would be severe in cases of non-compliance, whereas 
the incentives for compliant behaviour are high. This may apply to all international 
treaties, including the ones regarding human rights. Therefore, considering the neg-
ative effects of non-compliance on their reputational history, the first hypothesis as-
sumes democracies to mostly conform with human rights law. 
H1: A liberal democracy will comply with the majority of principles of the in-
ternational human rights treaties it has committed to. 
Besides reputation effects, other motives of states are also taken into consideration 
by this approach. Reputational and non-reputational interests can be in competition. 
If the reputation-unrelated costs are particularly high, reputation can become of sec-
ondary significance. This may make sense as reputation only conveys benefits to a 
certain degree and the reputation history has built throughout decades. A single act 
is unlikely to change credibility completely. Hence, non-compliance may also occur 
occasionally among liberal democracies if non-reputational costs are high. The costs 
of compliance with international human rights treaties are generally limited among 
democracies. They respect the underlying values and often already protect the cor-
responding rules within their territory. In many cases, human rights are implemented 
in domestic constitutions or other legislation, and protection is reviewed by national 
institutions like courts. Such domestic arrangements decrease the costs of entering 
new human rights agreements to a minimum. Nevertheless, situations can exist in 
which international human rights laws are particularly demanding or domestic ar-
rangements differ from the regulations of the UN treaties. Such situations can result 
in higher costs of compliance even for democracies which may lead to a worse per-
formance regarding specific treaties or provisions. Hence, as a second hypothesis, it 
is assumed that democracies comply less with treaties that are costly to implement 
than with regulation being less demanding to fulfil. 
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H2: Compliance of democracies with UN human rights treaties will vary be-
tween specific instruments dependent on their non-reputational costs. 
The compliance or non-compliance with specific treaties can only have an effect on 
the reputation of a state when it is known among the international community. If a 
state has ratified a treaty but does not follow its principles and reporting is lacking, 
the credibility does not diminish. Therefore, the existence of review mechanisms is 
especially important. As liberal democracies are concerned with their reputation, 
they will try to avoid negative coverage on their compliance with international regu-
lations. Thus, they may make increased efforts to comply just before they are re-
viewed. Summarizing, democracies are afraid of negative reviews on their compli-
ance as this involves reputation costs and states will, thus, take compliance measures 
increasingly before reports on their compliance are due. 
H3: Democracies will make greater efforts for compliance in the light of an 
upcoming review. 
These three hypotheses will be consequently tested in this thesis. The case selection 
and the deployed research design for assessing the deduced assumptions are elabo-
rated on in the following chapter.  
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3. Research design 
Space for further research was identified previously in this thesis regarding the com-
pliance patterns of democracies with international human rights instruments. In or-
der to assess this question, an in-depth analysis of a single case is conducted deter-
mining different compliance patterns with the UN human rights treaties. Australia is 
selected as a difficult but interesting case for liberal democracies. Afterwards, the 
specific data, operationalisation and research methods are laid out. 
3.1 The case of Australia 
When trying to find a suitable case to evaluate the compliance with international hu-
man rights instruments in democracies, it is important to be aware of what is meant 
by the term ‘democracy’. In this paper, the focus is placed on full democracies also 
described as polyarchies (Dahl, 1973) or liberal, consolidated or embedded democ-
racies (Merkel, 2010). This is necessary as the selected democracy must fulfil the pre-
conditions of the deduced hypotheses. According to the Polity V Index (Marshall & 
Gurr, 2020), 32 full democracies existed in 2018 having received ten out of ten points. 
When selecting a specific democracy from that pool, it is important to consider other 
possible influences on the human rights situation of the country except the UN in-
struments. While Europe is highly democratised, these states do not seem the best 
choice for evaluation as the European Human Rights Regime possesses its own pro-
tection mechanisms and a comparatively very effective monitoring and sanctioning 
apparatus. Therefore, the human rights situation is more likely to be influenced by 
the European Human Rights instruments than by the ones of the UN. Instead, a state 
should be picked that is not impacted by human rights regulations of other organisa-
tions. Additionally, it is useful to focus on a country that has some record of human 
rights violations as this enables comparisons between instruments linked to the sec-
ond hypothesis cornering the variation in costs. 
Having these conditions in mind, Australia seems an adequate choice. It is not a mem-
ber of any major regional organisation with a human rights regime. Besides, it faces 
ongoing critique for violating human rights in regards to asylum seekers and the In-
digenous population (Amnesty International, 2019). Additionally, it is not an easy 
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case since Australia is the only liberal democracy that does not possess a constitu-
tional human rights catalogue. Furthermore, international law cannot be directly 
translated into Australian legislation which las led to the fact that the voluntarily un-
dertaken international obligations cannot be asserted by the citizens before any na-
tional court (Evatt, 2003, pp. 43-44). If despite these factors, compliance with the UN 
human rights instruments exists in Australia, it may be assumed that the results apply 
to other liberal democracies with better rights enforcement as well. 
Finally, the case seems interesting and is suitable for analysis as there has not yet 
been a similar study looking at the human rights compliance of Australia in such de-
tail. Some single pieces of international human rights law and their implementation 
in Australia were interrogated by scholars including for example the ICESCR, the IC-
CPR and human rights law regarding refugees (Hearn & Eastman, 2000; Mapulanga-
Hulston & Harpur, 2009; Saul, 2013; Watkins, 2017). Nevertheless, a comprehensive 
view on the compliance of Australia with the various human rights treaties is missing. 
3.2 Methodology and data 
The following analysis will predominantly use qualitative means. For the qualitative 
content analyses, the documentation of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is used. 
The UPR was established in 2006 by General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/251. It 
represents a procedure of independent investigation on the “fulfilment by each State 
of its human rights obligations and commitments” (General Assembly resultion 
60/251, 2006, p. 3) conducted in all of the 193 member states regardless of their 
ratification of the respective instruments. Australia has been subject to two monitor-
ing cycles in 2010 and 2014 until now. The national reports on Australia by the UPR 
will be used as data for the qualitative assessment and are retrieved from the web 
page of the Human Rights Council2. These reports are considered suitable for the 
analysis as they contain information from three different sources: the state under 
review, UN organs such as treaty bodies and expert platforms, and domestic stake-
holders like NGOs and national human rights institutions (UN Human Rights Council, 
 
2 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/AUIndex.aspx  
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n.d.). Based on the different points of view on the country’s human rights situation, 
the UPR is seen to be the best source for attaining a complete picture. 
In the following chapter, the analysis will be conducted through the separate testing 
of all three hypotheses by deploying slightly different research designs. The second 
and third hypotheses are investigated through qualitative means only. For the evalu-
ation of H2 only two treaties that are divergent in their costs are picked in order to 
trace variation in compliance. The third assumption is tested by looking at the pattern 
of compliance in regard to all seven, applicable human rights treaties (see figure 1). 
International treaty Abbreviation Year of rati-
fication in 
Australia 
The International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination  
ICERD 1975 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
ICESCR 1975 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
ICCPR 1980 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
CEDAW 1983 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
CAT 1989 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC 1990 
The International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families 
ICPMW Not ratified 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities 
CRPD 2008 
The International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
ICED Not ratified 
Figure 1: International human rights treaties and their ratification status in Australia 
The analysis of H1 stands out methodologically as it will contain quantitative ele-
ments besides the qualitative content analysis. All UN human rights treaties ratified 
by Australia will be analysed in terms of compliance from a quantitative and qualita-
tive point of view. For the quantitative discovery, a specific indicator is deployed for 
each treaty. Human rights indicators can generally be understood “as indicators that 
are linked to human rights treaty standards, and that measure the extent to which 
duty-bearers are fulfilling their obligations and rights-holders enjoying their rights” 
(de Beco, 2008, p. 24). In this paper, the focus will be placed on the first part: com-
pliance with the actual treaty content. Thus, indicators are chosen to determine the 
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rights situation representing the key obligations contained in the agreements. The 
indicators’ implications for compliance are discussed on the basis of Australia’s most 
recent score in the light of the highest and lowest possible outcome. The scores are 
set into context by a qualitative content analysis in order to identify general compli-
ance or non-compliance. The indices used for each treaty can be derived from figure 
2.   
 
The assignment of specific indicators to the treaties brings an important asset to the 
literature on human rights compliance as many scholars have based their analyses 
only on political repression and civil liberties which seems to make sense for the ef-
fect of the ICCPR and the CAT. But for treaties concentrating on other rights such as 
social and cultural ones, the indicator appears to be less suitable. As the indicators 
are supposed to measure compliance, no development over time or comparison be-
tween before and after the ratification is necessary. Thus, only the most recent score 
available for Australia is adduced. For the purpose of measuring compliance, both the 
Treaty Indicator Conception and dimensions measured  
ICERD  Migrant Integration Policy 
Index (MIPEX; Huddleston, 
Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 
2015) 
Policies of integration of migrants regard-
ing basic rights, equal opportunities and a 
secure future 
ICESCR  Labour rights in law and 
practice (Center for Global 
Workers’ Rights, 2017) 
Protection and violations of labour rights 
in law and practice 
ICCPR  Latent human rights pro-
tection scores (Fariss, 
2019)  
Physical integrity and political rights com-
bined from nine different datasets 
CEDAW Gender Inequality Index 
(GII; UNDP, 2018) 
Gender inequality in the three domains re-
productive health, empowerment and 
work 
CAT  Physical integrity score 
from the CIRI dataset 
(Cingranelli, Richards, & 
Clay, 2014) 
State violence of citizens’ physical integ-
rity: torture, extrajudicial killings, political 
imprisonment and disappearance 
CRC  KidsRights Index 
(KidsRights Foundation, 
2020) 
Respect of children’s rights in the five do-
mains life, health, education, protection 
and Enabling Environment for Child Rights 
CRPD  World Disability Data 
(WORLD Policy Center, 
2017) 
Constitutional and legal recognition of 
equal rights for disabled people, inclusive 
education, non-discrimination at work, 
state assistance 
Figure 2: Respective indicators for each UN human rights treaty ratified in Australia 
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legal situation as well as the de facto situation are important to consider. Addition-
ally, the human rights treaties at hand cover whole population groups or wide human 
rights topics inheriting manifold facets. Hence, all of the datasets are indices that are 
comprised of different dimensions. A specific index is selected trying to capture the 
key aspect or general aim of each treaty. In order to see whether conformity is in 
place, the scores are reported in comparison to the minimum and maximum score 
and their meaning in regard to compliance is consequently discussed.  
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4. Empirical analysis 
For the analysis, the individual hypotheses are addressed separately using suitable 
human rights treaties and adequate – quantitative and/or qualitative – data. The hy-
potheses will be addressed in the order they were deduced in the second chapter. 
4.1 The overall compliance of Australia with UN human rights treaties 
The first hypothesis contains the assumption of overall compliant behaviour of de-
mocracies with the human rights treaties they ratified. It is to be tested by looking at 
all UN human rights covenants and conventions applicable to Australia. All quantita-
tive indicators and Australia’s scores are shown in figure 3. The implications of the 
numbers for compliance are consequently discussed and set into context by the qual-
itative analysis of the UPR. 









ICERD MIPEX (Huddleston et al., 2015) 0 100 66 
ICESCR Labour rights in law and practice 
(Center for Global Workers’ 
Rights, 2017) 
10 0 4.52 
ICCPR Latent human rights protection 
scores (Fariss, 2019) 
-3.8 5.4 1.75 
CEDAW GII (UNDP, 2018) 1 0 0.103 
CAT Physical integrity score from CIRI 
(Cingranelli et al., 2014) 
0 8 7 
CRC KidsRights Index (KidsRights 
Foundation, 2020) 
0 1 0.583 
CRPD World Disability Data (WORLD 
Policy Center, 2017) 
1 5 3.636* 
Figure 3: Indicators of Australia's compliance with the UN human rights treaties  
Annotation: * Own calculation of average score 
First of all, each value of Australia lays in the upper half of the index scale signifying 
better performance than the average or respectively the fixed midpoint of the scale. 
This already gives a hint about the rights situation in Australia. Some scores fall very 
short of the best possible score while others are closer to the medium. Thus, the data 
is to be discussed in terms of its explanatory power for compliance standards.  
Firstly, the MIPEX is used for the assessment of racial discrimination as the focus of 
the ICERD. Australia receives 66 out of 100 points. This score alone does not provide 
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much information on compliance. However, the MIPEX 2015 clusters the rated coun-
tries in six groups: favourable, slightly favourable, halfway favourable, slightly unfa-
vourable, unfavourable and critically unfavourable. In 20143, Australia belonged to 
the slightly favourable nations, the second-best group. The countries in this category 
are characterised by the comprehensive integration of migrants, but the failure of 
policies to tackle the condition that migrants are seen as foreigners instead of equal 
citizens (MIPEX, 2020b). Being classified as a slightly favourable country in terms of 
the migrant policy, general compliance with the ICERD may be assumed as the inclu-
sion of ethnic minorities such as migrants represents the core of the convention. 
This view is partly backed by qualitative data. The UPR points out that there have 
been efforts in fighting racial discrimination e.g., by the adoption of the Racial Dis-
crimination Act 1975. The chapter on ‘Multiculturalism and combating racism’ in the 
first cycle report positively stresses the existing ethic heterogeneity in Australia and 
the commitment to the inclusion and equal opportunities of citizens born overseas. 
Nevertheless, the Indigenous population represents an ethnic group that is especially 
prone to discrimination in Australia. The UPR reports provide a detailed description 
of the disadvantages Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people face, such as lower 
standards of education, more violence and abuse, a higher incidence of committing 
crimes and poorer health. All in all, “Many Indigenous peoples in Australia face sig-
nificant disadvantage.” (UN Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 10). Thus, compliance 
with the ICERD is not fully reached as Australia has not managed “guaranteeing them 
the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (ICERD, 
Art. 2.2) as demanded by the ICERD – at least not for the Indigenous population. The 
quantitative and qualitative results converge as compliance is not present regarding 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. However, they were not included in 
the MIPEX as the index only looks at ethnic minorities of migrants and not at indige-
nous minority groups. 
Regarding the ICESCR, Australia has received a score of 4.52 in Labour rights in law 
and practice which is located slightly in the upper half of the scale. Being very close 
to the average, compliance cannot be seen as indicated. The used index does not 
 
3 During the finalization of the thesis new MIPEX data became available assigning Australia a place in 
the Top 10 most favourable countries for migrants (MIPEX, 2020a).  
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contain such explicitly described categories as the MIPEX, but also differentiates be-
tween better and worse performance of the countries on a seven-level colour 
scheme. Australia falls in the third-best of the seven divisions indicating labour rights 
that are slightly favourable. 
The qualitative data is by contrast more positive about Australia’s compliance with 
the ICESCR. Its provisions are discussed under the chapters ‘Right to work’, ‘Right to 
social security’, ‘Right to health’ and ‘Right to adequate housing’ in the first UPR cycle. 
Despite representing major domains of rights, they only fill two pages. In the national 
report of the second cycle, the right to work and health are not even assessed any 
more. This seems to be due to the fact that these rights are considered as already 
sufficiently guaranteed since it is stated that “Efforts to secure the right to work and 
to ensure fair working conditions have played an important part” (UN Human Rights 
Council, 2010, p. 18). It is also reported that Australia has a comprehensive social 
security and public health system. The information gathered from both cycles of the 
UPR suggests that there are no major issues concerning the rights of the ICESCR in 
Australia and compliance is present. Bringing together quantitative and qualitative 
results, compliance seems to be mainly present, but the optimal rights situation is 
not yet accomplished. 
Australia has received 1.75 points in the Latent Human Rights Protection Scores 
which were chosen to indicate the compliance with the ICCPR. The index does not 
offer differentiation between groups of states. The zero is, however, set as the aver-
age score of all countries. Thus, a score above zero depicts a surpassing human rights 
performance. While the index does not allow the off-handed interpretation of Aus-
tralian compliance with the ICCPR, the high score demonstrates altogether good per-
formance. 
The UPR supports the affirmative perspective on the protection of civil and political 
rights. The first cycle report identifies already high standards in the protection of po-
litical rights: The death penalty was already abolished before the ratification, fair trial 
and rule of law are present. Despite the already high conformity, some new bills and 
state initiatives are mentioned in this regard that were still passed or announced in 
the recent years such as legislation prohibiting the reintroduction of the death 
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sentence or the installation of a new Independent National Security Legislation Mon-
itor. Furthermore, in the second cycle, it is stated that “The Australian Government 
is focussed on advancing civil and political rights. This includes advancing measures 
to protect freedom of speech, freedom of religion and other common law rights and 
liberties that have not been given sufficient focus domestically in recent years.” (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 2). In summary, both data sources report the political 
rights situation to be good; no areas of concern are indicated, and compliance, hence, 
exists. 
With 0.103 in the GII, used for the assessment of the CEDAW, Australia achieves a 
very good rating. The GII score is not calculated relative to the scores of the other 
countries, but “0” represents complete gender equality while “1” stands for maxi-
mum poor performance. As Australia’s score of 0.103 falls very close to the optimum, 
the achievement of gender-equal policies and situation as demanded by the CEDAW 
is standing to reason. 
The qualitative data points in a similar direction. After ratification of CEDAW, Aus-
tralia immediately took measures to ensure compliance by passing the Sexual Dis-
crimination Act in 1984. This act can be regarded as a direct enactment of the CEDAW 
as one of its objectives is “to give effect to certain provisions of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and to provisions of 
other relevant international instruments” (Part I, 3(a)). While stressing the improve-
ments and efforts in fighting female discrimination and enhancing political participa-
tion of women, economic equality remains a point for further engagement according 
to the first national report: “Improving women’s economic outcomes is critical to 
gender equality. In Australia, women’s earnings are still, on average, below those of 
men.” (UN Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 12). This problem was in fact attempted 
to be tackled in the meantime before the second review cycle as a national pay equity 
campaign was initiated in 2014. Awareness-raising can of course only be seen as the 
first move for change but is, nevertheless, a step in addressing the female rights issue 
pointed out by the UPR. Therefore, quantitative and qualitative data indicate that 
compliance is present in regard to most areas of living of women, whereas economic 
equality is not yet fully achieved. 
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The physical integrity scores extracted from the CIRI dataset are used for the investi-
gation of compliance regarding the CAT. The score is composed of four dimensions 
that are evaluated and ranked with a 0, 1 or 2 while the higher number identifies the 
better performance. The four dimensions added up, each country receives a sum-
mary score between 0 and 8. Australia’s latest score is at 7 which means that it re-
ceived the optimal points for three of the four aspects showing good respect for citi-
zen’s integrity rights. However, it only received 1 out of 2 points regarding the torture 
situation. 
Surprisingly, the rights of the CAT are merely mentioned in Australia’s first national 
report of the UPR. The unique action presented in the first report concerns the 
amendment in 2010 of division 274 on torture to the Criminal Code Act 1995. The 
topic receives slightly more attention in the second review cycle. The report illus-
trates compliant prevention of torture in the management of the use of force by the 
police, the treatment of prisoners and the regulations on extradition. The lacking rat-
ification of the Optional Protocol of the CAT remains a shortcoming. The sparse in-
formation provided on this human rights issue serves as an indication that compli-
ance cannot be unsatisfactory because otherwise, this important domain would have 
received far greater attention. A farther-reaching conclusion cannot be drawn due to 
the limited qualitative insights. 
Investigating compliance with the CRC, Australia attains a score of 0.583 in the 
KidsRights Index. Thereby, it is rated close to the medium mark although still in the 
upper half. Thus, the state falls in the second-best of five colour-schemed clusters. 
Taking a closer look at the individual categories of which the index is composed, it 
becomes clear that Australia performs poorly in one dimension while receiving high 
scores in the other four categories. In the domains of life, healthcare, education and 
protection of children, Australia attains ratings of at least 0.977 and is flagged with 
the most favourable of the five colour schemes. On the contrary, Australia only ob-
tains 0.071 points in the newly introduced dimension ‘Enabling Environment for Child 
Rights’. This shortcoming cannot be neglected as the domain aims at measuring the 
implementation of the key principles of the CRC and draws on the Concluding Obser-
vations of the CRC Committee for its classification (Arts, Webbink, & Jong, 2020, pp. 
9-10). Consequently, the indicator shows that while the general situation of children 
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is favourable regarding their life, health, education and protection, the rights envi-
ronment demanded by the CRC is not yet present. 
The UPR seems more satisfied with Australia’s performance regarding children’s 
rights as both cycles highlight the achievements in protecting children and providing 
for their special needs. The rights of children appear as an area of continuous efforts 
and improvements as there is, for example, a National Framework for Protecting Aus-
tralia’s Children 2009-2020 or a National Early Childhood Development Strategy. The 
report outlining the latter refers specifically to the CRC when explaining why a strat-
egy for children is necessary (Council of Australian Governments, 2009, p. 7). The 
second review cycle further stresses the achievements of the recent initiatives and 
files some new plans decided upon by Australia in the meantime. The information of 
the UPR on this treaty points in the direction of compliance as no major shortcoming 
has been acknowledged. This contradicts the quantitative finding. Variance exists be-
tween the conclusion of the CRC committee and the UPR as the latter states that “The 
rights of children play an important part in the development and application of family 
law.” (UN Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 14). This contradiction cannot be resolved 
in this thesis and the results for compliance with the CRC remain twofold. 
Lastly looking at the CRPD, Australia obtains 3.636 points on average of the WORLD 
Disability Data being close to the medium. The dataset does not offer a general clas-
sification of the countries which can be explained as it does not provide a summary 
score for countries but only ratings for the specific categories. Therefore, the average 
score is drawn from own calculations. Australia reaches the highest number of points 
in most of the policy areas in regard to disability rights, whereas it performs poorly in 
the section regarding constitutional rights. This is not a fundamental problem, as it 
has already been pointed out that Australia does not possess a constitutional bill of 
rights and only very few basic rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the constitution 
while most rights are codified in Common Law. Hence, the best possible rating for all 
the other indicators except one4 is of greater significance for this research than the 
 
4 Australia has received 3 point out of 5 for the financial support for families of children with a handi-
cap.  
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constitutional dimension. This hints towards preponderant compliance with the 
CRPD. 
The qualitative material mostly supports this result. The general stance of people 
with disabilities as fostered by the CRPD is valued in Australia according to the UPR 
which states that “Persons with disabilities are highly valued members of Australian 
communities and workplaces and make a positive contribution to Australian society” 
(UN Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 12). Respective legislation to address discrimina-
tion against people with handicaps was already passed in 1992 with the Disability 
Discrimination Act, and a major reform took place with the National Disability Strat-
egy 2010-2020. Nevertheless, the report recognizes the existence “of challenges in 
enjoying their rights on an equal basis with others” (UN Human Rights Council, 2010, 
p. 12). But instead of elaborating on specific shortcomings, it is referred to the devel-
opment of a comprehensive policy framework in Australia which also includes the 
new national strategy mentioned above. Thus, compliance does not yet seem to have 
been fully achieved, but in progression which is why the tone of the UPR in the re-
spective chapters appears positive. Linking the quantitative and qualitative perspec-
tive, overall compliance with the CRPD seems to be present whereas some challenges 
remain. 
In summary, both quantitative and qualitative data have shown an overall high stand-
ard of compliance in Australia. For all treaties, hints were found pointing in the direc-
tion of a good compliance record on the whole while also minor shortcomings exist. 
The most problematic human rights domain seems to be the racial discrimination as 
the Indigenous population is especially at risk of discriminatory practises. 
4.2 The variation of compliance between human rights realms 
In the following, the second hypothesis postulating variation between different fields 
of human rights dependent on their non-reputational costs is assessed. The compli-
ance with the ICERD as an assumed costly area and the ICCPR covering a less costly 
human rights domain are compared. The necessary efforts for implementing the trea-
ties are contrasted, and Australia’s conformity subsequently analysed. 
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Cost assessment of the ICERD and the ICCPR 
The ICERD is considered to contain more non-reputational costs for compliance than 
the ICCPR. A primary reason for this assumption is the divergence in the recognition 
of the specific human rights domain in the Australian constitution when it was 
adopted in 1900. The Australian constitution does not contain a bill of rights and only 
very few human rights are guaranteed on a constitutional basis. These include the 
right to acquisition of property “on just terms” (section 51 (xxxi)), the right to trial by 
a jury (section 80), the principle of non-discrimination (section 99) and the independ-
ent exercise of religion (section 116) (French, 2015). Additionally, the freedom of po-
litical communication was judicially derived from the constitution. The guarantees of 
rights directly named in the constitution or indirectly drawn from it, are prominently 
allocated within the political and civil rights and freedoms as well as social and eco-
nomic rights. It is commonly regarded that the general rights protected in Australia 
are similar to the principles and regulations of the ICCPR and ICESCR (Bailey, 1990). 
So, human rights protection in the domains of these two treaties does inherit very 
few costs of implementation as the principles were already existent before the rati-
fication of the international covenants and stipulated in the highest national law. 
In contrast to that, the recognition of ethnic minorities was not part of the constitu-
tion when it came into force. The first electoral system can be considered deeply ra-
cially discriminating as Aboriginal, Asian, African and Pacific Islander people were ex-
cluded from voting unless special entitlement on the State level was present (Costar, 
2018). The minority of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people seems to be ex-
ceptionally at risk for human rights violations and their preconditions were particu-
larly low before the ICERD came into force. When Australia ratified the convention, 
the Indigenous population had only achieved the right to vote 13 years previous and 
they still represented an exemption from compulsory voting. Hence, legal distinctions 
had been in place between ethnic minorities before Australia was a party to the 
treaty and the eradication of such discrepancy was needed to comply. As more legal 
measures were missing in the Australian system regarding the ICERD and the change 
of consequent practises was necessary, the implementation contained more actual 
costs than of the ICCPR. Subsequently, the compliance with these two treaties differ-
ing in costs is assessed to test the second hypothesis. 
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Compliance with the ICERD 
As the first treaty ratified by Australia in 1975, the ICERD obligates all treaty parties 
to establish a legal framework for the effective fight of racial discrimination and calls 
for “special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and pro-
tection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” (ICERD, Art. 2.2). As shown above, this represents a condition that was not 
in place at the time of ratification. Since then, there have been efforts by Australia to 
address racial discrimination as pointed out by the UPR national reports. The first 
step towards eliminating respective legal gaps was executed by the adoption of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 in the same year as the ratification of the ICERD. This 
act represents a direct enactment of the ICERD into national legislation fulfilling arti-
cle 2.1d which is calling upon the parties to “prohibit and bring to an end, by all ap-
propriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimi-
nation by any persons, group or organization.” Another important step towards com-
pliance was taken in 1993 with the adoption of the Native Title Act 1993 directly 
aimed at the non-discrimination of the native population. There have been additional 
efforts to enhance this human rights domain at the end of the 2000s. Important to 
mention is the affirmation of Australia to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in 2009. Other key efforts include the formal apology of the Australian Gov-
ernment to the Indigenous people and the ‘Stolen generation’, the National Indige-
nous Law and Justice Framework from 2009 and the 2010 reinstatement of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975. 
Besides the general efforts valued by the UN report, challenges remain regarding the 
dealing with the Indigenous population in Australia. Out of the 24 pages of the na-
tional report of the first UPR cycle, two of them focus particularly on Indigenous Aus-
tralians representing a special section separate from the part on combating racism. 
These two pages do not only list improvements made but also identify still existing 
discriminatory practises and structures within Australia. For example, it is pointed out 
that “Many Indigenous peoples in Australia face significant disadvantage” (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 10), and life expectancy as well as infant mortality are 
significantly worse for people with an indigenous background. 
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Overall, racial discrimination seems to be a crucial point for human rights improve-
ments according to the UPR. In the first review cycle, two of the eight identified pri-
orities for domestic implementation of human rights particularly focus on the rights 
of the Indigenous minorities. As there was large space for improvement in this do-
main, also major advancement could be seen since the ratification. Though, complete 
compliance could not be reached as severe problems regarding the situation of In-
digenous Australians remain. 
Compliance with the ICCPR 
Primary political and civil rights were already in place in Australia before the ratifica-
tion of the ICCPR. Accordingly, the first UPR cycle national report identifies already 
high standards of political rights protection: The death penalty was already abolished 
before the ratification, fair trial and rule of law are present. The implementation of 
the rights of the ICCPR fill about three pages in the first cycle. However, most of the 
information regarding the right to life is more connected to the provisions of the CAT 
and the ICED that is not ratified by Australia. Within the field of religious freedoms, 
no shortcomings are identified but additional efforts mentioned in order to counter-
act stereotypes and foster social inclusion of all religious groups in the country. In the 
second cycle, this domain is not even covered any more indicating no summons to 
change by the UN. Concerning the section on justice, Australia’s performance in fair 
jurisdiction is reported to be satisfactory as the rule of law principle is implemented, 
the power of the executive branch restricted and just trial practises enforced. No re-
maining challenges are included in the first report. The second documentation does 
not incorporate any general principles regarding fair legal procedures or similar hu-
man rights fields. In lieu, recent financial investments of the Australian government 
are highlighted. This illustrates the state’s interest in further improvement given ac-
count by the plans to invest billions of dollars into legal assistance for enhancing just 
jurisdiction. In the second cycle report, the self-declared focus of the Australian Gov-
ernment on further enhancing civil and political rights is pointed out. The political 
rights situation is, hence, considered to not face any mentionable challenges and Aus-
tralia’s compliance with the treaty. 
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To sum up, the conformity varies between the ICCPR and the ICERD. While no defects 
are reported regarding the ICCPR, the UN calls for changes in the dealing with the 
Indigenous population in order to reach compliance with the ICERD. This corresponds 
with the expected impact of implementation costs. The fulfilment of the ICCPR was 
easier as most rights were already guaranteed and enacted in the country. As op-
posed to this, the costs for translating the legislation of the ICERD into domestic prac-
tise required greater efforts and the implementation is not yet concluded since dis-
criminatory structures are still in place. Thus, the analysis of the compliance with the 
two treaties supports H2 arguing that non-reputational costs play a role for democ-
racies in whether they comply or not. 
4.3 The effect of reviews on human rights compliance 
For testing the third hypothesis on the impact of upcoming reviews, all human rights 
treaties applicable to Australia are qualitatively assessed in regard to noticeable 
changes just before the publication of the first cycle national report of the UPR in 
2010. The first cycle is of interest as it represents the first human rights evaluation 
for Australia in all domains. It takes a look at a broad time span covering the human 
rights development since the ratification of the respective treaties and even beyond 
while consecutive review cycles only cover the few years since the previous review. 
In the following, the human rights treaties will be listed in chronological order of their 
ratification and explored whether the upcoming UPR cycle report was accompanied 
by greater efforts for compliance. 
The first treaty is the ICERD. Despite the essential step towards racial non-discrimi-
nation represented by the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 following the ratification of 
the ICERD, not many further important measures in this regard were reported by the 
UPR until the next century. The only considerable effort mentioned consisted of the 
Native Title Act 1993. Despite these two decisive legislative acts, the UPR cycle only 
refers to actions that were taken in recent years before the review in 2010. Important 
to mention is the affirmation of Australia to the Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples in 2009. Other pivotal efforts at the end of the 2000s include the formal 
apology of the Australian Government to the Indigenous people and the ‘Stolen gen-
eration’, the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework from 2009 and the 2010 
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reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. Thus, the data displays that 
many efforts to enhance this human rights domain have been taken just before the 
first UPR cycle was due to be finished. 
The measures to implement the social, economic and cultural rights provisions of the 
ICESCR in Australia do not fill much space in the UPR reports. This is due to the fact 
that these rights are considered as already sufficiently guaranteed since it is stated 
that “Efforts to secure the right to work and to ensure fair working conditions have 
played an important part in Australia’s history.” (UN Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 
18). In this manner, it is for instance reported that Australia possesses comprehensive 
systems for safeguarding social security and public health. The information gathered 
from both cycles of the UPR suggests that there have not been identified any major 
issues concerning the rights of the ICESCR in Australia. Thus, not many initiatives in 
this regard are listed since the ratification of the ICESCR. Despite the introduction of 
Medicare, an Australian universal public health system, in 1984, the only measures 
mentioned were taken from 2008 onwards. It includes most prominently the Fair 
Work Act 2009. Other actions in this time horizon encompass the Government’s 
white paper on homelessness and the consecutive National Partnership Agreement 
on people lacking shelter and the reform of Australia’s health and hospitals system 
in 2010. Therefore, the few additional efforts referred to in the UPR national reports 
also fall in the time until the publication of the first UPR cycle in 2010. Thus, the data 
indicates that compliance was already good since the beginning, but further improve-
ment were carried out before reviewing was due. 
Like for the ICESCR, the rights of the ICCPR are already regarded sufficiently secured 
because the key principles are implemented in Australia and no severe shortcomings 
are diagnosed. Besides no need for extensive action, there were some new bills and 
state initiatives passed or announced right in the year 2010 of the first review. These 
actions include, for example, legislation prohibiting the reintroduction of the death 
sentence, the reassessment of the Family Law Act 1975 regarding family violence and 
the installation of a new Independent National Security Legislation Monitor all taken 
in 2010. 
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When looking at women’s rights tackled in the CEDAW, the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 may be regarded as the first key achievement. Between this legislative act and 
2009, not a single measure for women’s rights or gender equality was reported to be 
adopted by the Australian government. Since then, actions have been taken or were 
announced shortly before the end of the first cycle. This includes the Fair Work Act 
2009 also containing provisions against sex- or gender-based discrimination at work 
and for equal remuneration of sexes as well as the first comprehensive Paid Parental 
Leave scheme. It points in the direction concerning a possible effect of the review 
mechanisms already displayed regarding political and civil freedoms. Efforts were not 
only made right before the first UPR cycle in 2010, but also in the meantime between 
the two cycles. While the first national report stressed the improvements in fighting 
discrimination due to gender or sex and in political participation of women, economic 
equality is mentioned as a point for further engagement: “Improving women’s eco-
nomic outcomes is critical to gender equality. In Australia, women’s earnings are still, 
on average, below those of men.” (UN Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 12). Initial 
steps in addressing this problem have been undertaken between the first and second 
review cycle by a national campaign of pay equity started in 2014. While awareness-
raising does probably not suffice to close the gender pay gap, it nevertheless provides 
support of the assumed impact of reviewing on rights compliance in democracies. 
The rights of the CAT are merely mentioned in Australia’s first national report of the 
UPR. The most prominent achievements in this regard were conducted even before 
the ratification with the abolishment of the death penalty in 1973 (by the Common-
wealth) and in 1986 (by all States). Since then, only two measures were reported in 
the first cycle national documentation: One was the amendment of division 274 on 
torture to the Criminal Code Act 1995 added in 2010, the other consisted in new 
guidelines for the police cooperation with states where the death penalty could apply 
announced in 2009. The second report illustrates compliant prevention of torture in 
the management of the use of force by the police, the treatment of prisoners and the 
regulations on extradition. The fact that Australia is not a party to the Optional Pro-
tocol of the CAT is regarded as a deficiency. Nevertheless, the second report does not 
contain information on measures taken in the upcoming of the due date of the re-
view. While the amendment of the Criminal Code Act in 2010 and the new police 
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cooperation guidelines from 2009 reported in the first cycle may indicate increased 
efforts before the review, too little information is provided to identify a pattern of 
enlarged initiatives or legislation passing before the reporting process. 
When looking into both cycles of the UPR, the achievements of Australia with respect 
to the CRC are highlighted. At the first glance on the first national report, it is already 
noticeable that the essential steps for children’s rights seem to have been made in 
recent years before the first UN review was published. The actions for children by 
Australia that are stressed in the UPR were primarily taken in the years 2006 to 2010. 
Especially 2009, the year right before the end of the first UPR cycle, has been packed 
with new initiatives for the younger population. The first National Framework for 
Protecting Australia’s Children 2009-2020 has been announced by the Australian 
Government. In the same year, a National Early Childhood Development Strategy 
aiming for investments in the very first years of child development has been adopted 
by the Council of Australian Governments. The report on the development strategy 
particularly alludes to the CRC in the reasons why a strategy for children is required 
(Council of Australian Governments, 2009, p. 7). Additionally, the Australian Govern-
ment officially apologised to child migrants in November 2009 who were dealt with 
under the historical child migrant schemes and may not have been adequately cared 
for. The second review cycle stressed the achievements of the recent initiatives and 
files some new plans and ambitions decided upon by Australia in the meantime. This 
includes a Second Action Plan (2012–2015), amendments in 2012 to the Family Law 
Act, a Royal Commission for Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse set up in 
2013 and the intention announced in 2015 to provide better services and enhanced 
access to them for disadvantaged and vulnerable children. The information on this 
treaty points in the direction of compliance provoked by upcoming human rights re-
view. 
When looking at the CRPD, respective legislation for non-discrimination for handi-
capped people was already adopted in 1992 with the Disability Discrimination Act. 
The major disability reform highlighted in both cycles of the UPR took, however, until 
2010 when the National Disability Strategy 2010-2020 came into force. It aims for 
improvement and equality for people with handicaps in a variety of spheres of life 
through an inclusive approach. This reform process was agreed upon shortly after the 
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ratification and right before the due date of the first UPR cycle, just like the new Dis-
ability (Access to Premises — Buildings) Standards 2010 and the Development for All: 
Towards a Disability Inclusive Australian Aid Program 2009-2014. Also, right before 
the second UPR cycle report was due, an announcement of the Australian Govern-
ment of higher spending on disability deployment was made. Like in the assessment 
of most previous UN human rights treaties, an effect of the upcoming review is re-
vealed. 
Having looked at the efforts of the Australian governments regarding all international 
human rights treaties applicable to the country, the UPR data supports hypothesis 
three. The findings show that there have been increased efforts and passing in re-
spective legislation especially right before the first review cycle in 2010. While spe-
cific patterns before the review could not be demonstrated for all treaties due to 
insufficient coverage of the human rights domain (especially for the CAT), all sections 
show at least some effort right before the publication of the monitoring process. 
Thus, this thesis justifies the assumption that approaching review mechanisms have 
an impact on democracies’ efforts in complying with international law. 
To sum up the findings of the whole analysis, all three hypotheses were supported 
by the analysed data. Therefore, the findings provide support for the compliance of 
Australia with the UN human rights treaties as well as the effect of forthcoming re-
views on the Australian efforts for compliance. Additionally, the assessment has 
shown that treaties with higher, non-reputational costs caused by missing domestic 
legislation matter. These implementation costs outweigh reputational benefits of 
compliance. Hence, conformity is lower concerning high-cost treaties.  
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5. Discussion 
Following the empirical analysis, the findings will consequently be discussed and in-
terpreted. Limitations of the thesis are displayed and outlooks for further research 
given. 
5.1 Interpretation of the findings 
In the previous analysis, support for all three hypotheses was found. H1 postulated 
that democracies possess an overall good record in compliance and respect the ma-
jority of human rights treaties they have ratified. This was found to be true for the 
case of Australia. The finding corresponds with the existing literature on democracies 
and compliance. It matches with other papers that have expected and shown higher 
compliance rates among democracies than among autocracies (Mansfield et al., 
2002; Neumayer, 2005; Von Stein, 2016). Additionally, the thesis lines up with the 
studies that created a positive prospect regarding human rights treaties and compli-
ance (Lutz & Sikkink, 2000; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 2013). 
Besides the theoretical assumptions, the results regarding H1 match other findings 
on the difference between quantitative and qualitative methods. Although not hav-
ing used statistical analysis, the quantitative indicators nevertheless produced partly 
different outcomes compared to the qualitative content analysis, as previously re-
ported by other scholars (see Hafner-Burton & Ron, 2009). The qualitative analyses 
produced more positive outcomes concerning some treaties such as the ICESCR and 
the CRC than the quantitative ones. The divide has been explained among other fac-
tors by the different interpretation of findings (ebd., pp. 374-377) and diverging data 
deployment (ebd., pp. 377-383). By discussing compliance with the treaties from 
both perspectives, divergent findings could be recognised and set in context with 
each other. Hence, the combination of quantitative and qualitative elements enabled 
the production of more robust findings than would have been able otherwise. 
The second hypothesis claimed non-reputational costs of treaties to make a differ-
ence regarding the compliance of democracies. The analysis has shown that different 
costs of implementation implied distinct levels of compliance in the comparison be-
tween the ICCPR and the ICERD. This finding bolsters H2. The outcome coincides with 
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the observation that compliance varies across issues or policy areas (Doyle & Luck, 
2004). It also backs the often-heard argument of differing costs in this regard (Lucena 
Carneiro & Apolinário, 2016; Lutmar, Carneiro, & Mitchell, 2016) which matches the 
reputation theory. The finding adds to the literature by proving the impact of dispar-
ate implementation costs not between policy areas, but within the human rights do-
main concerning different treaties. Therefore, additional backing is provided for the 
theory enlarging the scope of the cost-related argument. Hence, support is adminis-
tered that compliance is not a simple, direct consequence of treaty ratification among 
democracies. Different kinds of costs – reputational and non-reputational ones – 
matter and shape the individual compliance patterns. 
H3 argued for increased compliance efforts among democracies before reviews were 
due to be published. The finding on this hypothesis backs the reputational assump-
tion in a special way as no other motivation for compliance before the reviews seems 
to be imaginable than reputation. Although the findings are consistent with the the-
oretical expectation, they contradict previous research on the impact of review 
mechanisms on human rights. Scholars have formerly found a limited effect of the 
observation and recommendation mechanisms within the UN (e.g., Heyns & Viljoen, 
2002; Krommendijk, 2014). The inconsistency of results can be explained as other 
researchers have typically looked at the developments after reviews were published, 
not before as well as having focused on the specific UN treaty monitoring bodies. As 
this thesis investigated the effect of upcoming reviews specifically on democracies, it 
provided a new differentiation of the argument based on reputation theory and thus 
produced different results than previous research. Additionally, the impact of the 
UPR was assessed instead of the traditionally interrogated treaty monitoring bodies. 
This may be of significance as Etone (2019) found the UPR to be more effective due 
to its universality. To conclude, the assessment of the effect of upcoming reviews 
exclusively on democracies based on reputational assumptions represents a new as-
set to the literature. As this thesis backed the conjecture with empirical evidence, it 
would be utile to further prove this linkage. 
The analysis has provided more insights into patterns of compliance among democ-
racies. Even if the concrete results only apply directly to Australia, they also enrich 
the knowledge about the compliance of democracies in general. Australia could be 
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seen as a rather difficult case because it possesses neither a constitutional bill of 
rights nor a possibility of direct enforcement of international law. This means that 
the legal commitments Australia has undertaken cannot be claimed by citizens be-
fore any Australian court. Based on the limited enforcement of rights, the likelihood 
of compliance with the UN human rights treaties was expected to be low compared 
to other democracies. As the data for Australia supports all hypotheses, it can be as-
sumed that this may also be the case for democracies where rights enforcement is 
comparatively stronger. However, to expand the body of knowledge on compliance 
within democracies even further, additional case studies for other countries would 
be enriching, and a cross-country statistical analysis on the deduced hypotheses 
would allow conclusions with a broader scope. 
5.2 Limitations 
While the empirical analysis has produced evidence for all of the hypotheses, some 
limitations and shortcomings remain in the thesis that restrict the presented findings. 
The first limitation of this thesis lays in the fact that it does not allow the drawing of 
any causal links of the influence of human rights treaties. As the paper is concerned 
with compliance with these instruments, their impact is neither questioned nor ana-
lysed. Thus, this thesis can offer no insights into the question of whether human 
rights law leads to enhanced respect in the countries that have committed to it. In 
order to interrogate the effect of such treaties, a different research project would be 
needed that may use qualitative process tracing for its purpose. In this manner, the 
causality could be explored. 
In addition, the quantitative indicators do not represent the ideal means for analysing 
compliance. While indices could be found that match the provisions of the treaties 
quite well, most of them are not exactly designed for measuring the compliance with 
such law. As it is challenging to exercise the distinction between compliance and non-
compliance on this basis, the scores could only be used in connection with qualitative 
insights. A way to circumvent this problem might be by looking at the reported viola-
tions against the treaties. This approach was not used in the thesis as the data collec-
tion turned out to be challenging and the interference of compliance based on the 
number of field cases also remains difficult to draw. Nevertheless, through a research 
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project with a research design focussed explicitly on violation or case data, useful 
complementary findings to the analysis at hand could be gathered. 
Another possible point of critique consists in the fact that the UPR was used as data 
for the qualitative analysis. As a secondary source, it possesses the merit of already 
only including the major achievements in human rights and not mentioning every 
legislative act, statement or announcement regardless of their scope and signifi-
cance. This enables a more focussed qualitative analysis. The information from the 
national reports may, however, not be entirely unbiased. The criteria for which ef-
forts are included in the reports are not disclosed by the UN. Hence, the findings es-
pecially for H3 on the effect of upcoming reviews should further be tested in ensuing 
research. For this purpose, it might be advantageous to assess the amount of respec-
tive legislation quantitatively over time and check for statistically significant in-
creased adoption before the review. 
While successive research could be drawn from the limitations of the thesis, the as-
sets of this research project may also expand the validity of further studies. Quanti-
tative and qualitative data are used and thus prevent the dilemma of differing out-
comes due to the methodological approach as identified by Hafner-Burton and Ron 
(2009). Consecutive inquiries could also profit from the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative data. Lastly, the present paper utilises a different quantitative indica-
tor adjusted to each international treaty. Previous literature has often only drawn on 
physical integrity or political repression data to analyse the human rights situation 
overall. While such data is fitting for the ICCPR and the CAT, it seems less suitable for 
measuring the rights situation of children. Future scholars could work further on the 
adjustment of such indicators and deploy them also for quantitative effects of human 
rights law.  
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6. Conclusion 
Returning to Louis Henkin’s quote from the beginning, it at least applies to Australia. 
This thesis has shown that the state observes almost all principles of international 
law and almost all of its obligations in the human rights domain almost all of the time. 
The present research gives a positive outlook for the efficacy of international human 
rights instruments. Since Australia as the chosen case example for democracies has 
demonstrated a good record of compliance with human rights regulations, there are 
also promising prospects for the general rights protection within democracies that 
have ratified respective UN instruments. 
The research at hand has asked the question on the patterns of compliance of de-
mocracies with human rights law. It was drawn on the reputational argument of Guz-
man (2002, 2005, 2008) as an extension of institutionalism. Based on the approach 
that the reputational history and the advantages granted from a good reputation 
matter for states when deciding whether to comply or not, three hypotheses were 
deduced. Firstly, it was assumed that a democracy will comply with the majority of 
human rights law it has committed to. Secondly, non-reputational costs are still ex-
pected to play a role and cause divergent compliance in regard to different human 
rights treaties. Thirdly, review mechanisms were hypothesised to be linked with in-
creased efforts for compliance. 
Australia was selected as an interesting, yet difficult case for democracies. While the 
first hypothesis was analysed through the deployment of both quantitative indices 
for each treaty and qualitative means, the other two assumption were tested only 
qualitatively. The findings support all three hypotheses. Overall, compliance exists in 
Australia, albeit particularly the implementation of the ICERD on racial discrimination 
remains an issue for the Indigenous population. Costs for compliance also make a 
difference when comparing the two cost-diverging treaties on racial discrimination 
(ICERD) and on political rights (ICCPR). Thus, law that is less costly due to already 
existing domestic provisions is better complied with. Lastly, the analysis also provided 
backing for the assumed effect of forthcoming reviews. The data indicated increased 
efforts expressed by additional legislation and other actions for compliance before 
the Universal Periodic Review was due for Australia. 
 42 
With these findings, the present thesis adds to the research on compliance with hu-
man rights provisions, especially to the literature based on Guzman’s reputational 
approach. It further backs the optimistic view on human rights. Additionally, evidence 
is provided for the effect of upcoming review mechanisms which have not yet been 
fully explored by the scholars in this domain. Hence, this thesis brings new findings 
on compliance in Australia and democracies to the table, while opening contact 
points for further research that could validate the here drawn conclusions and ex-
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